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JURISDICTION
Respondent Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (the "Fund") and
Mity Lite (the "Employer") agree with and adopt the statement of jurisdiction in the
brief of Petitioner Robert Smith ("Smith"), regarding Petitioner's appeal from a
decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah (the "Commission").
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

First Issue: The following issue was preserved before the

Commission. See Defendants1 Response to Motion for Review. (R. at 112-13).
Whether the Commission's Order denying Smith
permanent total disability benefits should be upheld
because the Commission's finding of fact, that an
industrial accident was not the medical cause of Smith's
claimed disability, was based on substantial evidence.
Standard of Review:

An agency's factual findings will be affirmed if

supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)(1988); accord Kennecott Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (1993).
B.

Second Issue:

The following issue was presented to the Commission

by Respondent. See Defendants' Response to Motion for Review. (R. at 114-15).
Whether the Commission's finding of no medical
causation precludes consideration of either the
"sequential decision-making process" or the "odd lot
doctrine ."

1

Standard of Review:

The correction of error standard is applied to agency

interpretations of general law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d); Zissi v. Tax
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852-53 & n. 2 (Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The following statutes and agency rules are determinative in this case:
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988)
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(2)(d) (1991)
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-17 (1990)
See Petitioner's Brief, Addendum Four or Text.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Prior to the industrial accident, Smith's earnings ranged from four
dollars to six dollars per hour and had never exceed six dollars per hour. (Transcriptof Hearing, R. at line 23, p. 203; line 6, p. 204; and lines 2-3, p. 205.)
After the industrial accident on May 23, 1990, and prior to surgery by
Dr. James Adams, Petitioner Robert Smith consulted or was examined by four
different physicians. Smith was treated by Robert M. Berry, M.D. , an orthopedist,
in May 1990 (R. at 3,4); by Alan L. Colledge, M.D. at the Cottonwood Spine
Institute in August 1990 (R. at 317-18); by Charles M. Smith, Jr., M.D., an
orthopedist, in September 1990 (R. at 305-06); and, at the request of the Fund, by
Nathaniel M. Nord, M.D., a neurologist, in December 1990 (R. at 14-16).
All of these doctors recommended some form of physical therapy,
physical conditioning and weight loss rather than surgery to treat Smith's pain
symptoms. (McCann Letter to the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, February
2

4, 1994, R. at 439-442). Dr. Smith also referred Smith to a psychologist and a
psychiatrist at a pain clinic "for evaluation of the psychodynamics in relation to his
back." (R. at 302).
Finally, on January 11, 1991, Smith consulted a neurosurgeon, Dr.
James Adams, who recommended and performed spinal surgery in May of 1991 (R.
at 280-81), and who, when Smith continued to complain of pain, performed two
follow-up surgeries, the last of which occurred in August of 1992.
274, 277 and 441).

(R. at 270,

After these surgeries, Dr. Adams concluded that Smith

"should be considered 100% permanently disabled." (Letter to Sherlynn White
Fenstermaker, August 2, 1993, R. at 268). However, Dr. Adams evaluation was
not done in accordance with the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment, 4th Edition as modified. (ALJ Order, p. Five, R. at 101, Petitioner's
Addendum Three.)
On January 14, 1994, Dr. Nord and orthopedist Wallace E. Hess,
M.D., assessed Smith's impairment attributable to the industrial accident at twelve
percent (12%) of the whole person; and further concluded that this impairment
would not prevent Smith from returning to any kind of competitive employment.
(R. at 246-47).
On February 4, 1994, psychiatrist, David L. McCann, M.D. reported
to the Fund his conclusions that the pain Smith suffers from is the result of

3

"conversion disorder;"1 "somatoform pain disorder;"2 and "opioid dependency;
that Smith "has demonstrated a consistent worsening pattern of inconsistencies,
establishing that a large portion of his disability is not caused by objective
factors.... There is a pattern of exaggerated physical complaints

" (R. at 449);

and that Smith "did not suffer from permanent impairment." (R. at 450).
The November 23, 1994 a medical panel reported to the ALJ that it
had examined Smith and his medical records (Report of Medical Panel, R. at 70-87),
and that Smith had a whole person impairment of twenty-five percent (25%) of
which only about eight and seven-tenths percent (8.7%) was attributable to the
industrial accident, and the remaining fifteen and three-tenths percent (16.3%) was
attributable to both pre-existing and subsequent conditions, including a shoulder
injury, and psychiatric conditions including somatoform pain disorder, opiate
dependency, personality disorder and depression. The panel stated further medical
care will include "weight control, exercise approaches, and use of appropriate antiinflammatory drugs, and "safe" pain relieving medications....A pain clinic for a fixed
period of time may have merit...." (R. at 75). The medical panel report also

1

Conversion disorder, as defined by Dr. McCann, is a function of
personality patterns and information and behavioral processing rather than objective
external physical injury, which is not an objective impairment because it is a
subjective syndrome. McCann Letter to the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,
February 4, 1994, p. 18, R. at 449.
I
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary. (W.B. Saunders Company,
1994 ed.), defines somatoform as "denoting psychogenic symptoms resembling
those of physical disease"; and psychogenesis as "production of a symptom or
illness by psychic, as opposed to organic, factors."
4

contained a report by Robert H. Burgoyne, M.D, psychiatrist, who examined Smith
in March 1995, and whose diagnosis "agrees with Dr. McCann." (R. at 81).
The Commission, after "having considered the medical and other
evidence regarding the relationship between Mr. Smith's industrial accident and his
now claimed permanent total disability (emphasis added)," adopted the report of
the medical panel. (Order Denying Motion for Review, p. 4, R. at 126, Addendum
Two, Petitioner's Brief)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The central question of this case is whether the industrial accident
was the medical cause of Smith's claimed permanent total disability. The question
of medical causation is a question of fact.

When the parties submitted conflicting

medical opinions on this issue, the ALJ was required to, and did, convene a medical
panel to resolve this issue of fact. The Commission was entitled to rely on expert
opinion rendered by the panel, especially when the Commission considered other
evidence in arriving at its finding that the industrial accident was not the cause of
Smith's claimed permanent total disability. And, the Commission's finding of fact
on this issue must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence when viewed of
the entire record. Having determined there was no medical causation, the
Commission was not required to consider either the "sequential decision making
analysis" or the "odd lot doctrine."

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The Commission's Decision That the industrial Accident Was Not the
Medical Cause of Smith's Disability Is a Finding of Fact Supported by
Substantial Evidence.
In this case, the Industrial Commission denied Petitioner's claim
because:
Mr. Smith has failed to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that his industrial accident is the medical
cause of his now claimed permanent total disability.
(Emphasis added)."
(Commission's Order R. at p. 126, Appendix A, Petitioner's Brief.)

A "claimant

must establish medical causation to have a compensable injury." Allen .v Industrial
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 22-27 (Utah 1986). And, "medical causation is a matter of
fact." Zuoon v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah App. 1993).
Petitioner Smith was required to prove his work injury was the medical cause of
his disability by a preponderance of the evidence. Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n,
855"P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. 1993).
A factual finding by an agency will not be set aside unless it is
unsupported "by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1993); accord King v.
Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993). As the record shows,
the Commission's finding was clearly based on substantial evidence, including a
medical panel report.

6

The facts show that the parties offered confliciting medical opinions
into evidence regarding medical causation. On one hand, Petitioner Smith offered
Dr. Adam's opinion that Smith had incurred permanent total disability as a result of
the industrial accident. Record at p. 268. On the other hand, the Defendants
offered the opinions of Dr. Nord, Dr. Hess and Dr. McCann that the industrial
accident was not the cause of Smith's claimed permanent, total disability and did
not prevent his return to work. Record at p. 247, 449-51. When medical reports
conflict on "medical causation," the Supreme Court of Utah has ruled such conflict
is a "significant medical issue" requiring submission to a medical panel, because
"[alllowing the ALJ, who has no medical training and possesses no medical
degrees, to determine medical causation as a threshold question ... effectively
eviscerates the beneficence of [Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9]."
Industrial Comm'n, 904 P.2d 6 7 1 , 674 (Utah 1995).

3

Willardson v.

Therefore, the ALJ was

required to convene a medical panel for a professional opinion as to whether the
industrial accident was the medical cause of the claimed permenant disability.
The medical panel, after examining the Petitioner and reviewing his
extensive medical history, concluded that although Smith had a whole person

3

Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9 states in part: A panel will be utilized by
the Administrative Law Judge where: (1) One or more significant medical issues
may be involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by
conflicting medical reports. Significant medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary by
more than 5% of the whole person."(Emphasis added).
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impairment twenty-five percent (25%), only eight and seven-tenths percent (8.7%)
was attributable to the industrial accident. The remaining sixteen and three-tenths
percent (16.3%) of whole person impairment was attributable to both pre-existing
and subsequent conditions, i.e. a shoulder injury, and psychiatric conditions
including somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, personality disorder and
depression. (Report of Medical Panel, R. at 74-76). Using these impairment ratings
in conjunction with its other findings of fact, the Commission determined that
Smith had not proven his industrial accident was the medical cause of his claimed
disability.
A.

The Commission Properly Considered the Report of the Medical Panel.
Petitioner claims the Commission erroneously relied solely on the

findings of a medical panel in making its determination. Petitioner's Brief. However,
the law is clear that the Commission may "base its findings and decision on the
report of the panel". Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(2)(d) (1991) 4 ; Willardson v.
Industrial Comm'n, 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995).
There is no dispute that the Commission did include the medical
panel's report in arrinving at its conclusions. However, the record also clearly
shows that the Commission also relied on other factual evidence, including the

4

§ 35-1-77(2)(d) U.C.A. reads in its entirety:

The commission may base its findings and decision on the
report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary
finding.
8

Findings of Fact of the ALJ and other medical records before the Commission. For
example, the Commission's Order states:
the medical panel and other physicians who have examined Mr. Smith
find a consistent pattern of nonindustrial depression, somatoform pain
disorder, opiate dependency, personality and depression which are
diagnosed as the cause of his inability to return to work. (Emphasis
added).
(Commission's Order, p. 3, R. at 135, Petitioner's Brief, Addendum Two).

And,

As noted on page five of the ALJ's decision, "Mr. Smith has
demonstrated a consistent worsening pattern of inconsistencies. A
large portion of his disability is not caused by objective factors. He
has a pattern of exaggerated physical complaints.
(Commission's Order, p. 4, R. at 135, Petitioner's Brief, Addendum Two). The
ALJ's Findings of Facts, which the Commission adopted, identified the following
additional facts:
14.

His treating physician gave Mr. Smith a 100 percent disability rating,
but it was not done in accordance with the AMA Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th Edition as modified. It
cannot therefore be considered since it provides very little objective
information.

19.

Much of Mr. Smith's current inability to return to work stems from
factors other than the results of the injury. He has a personality
disorder according to both the psychiatrist on the medical panel (Dr.
Burgoyne) and the psychiatrist (Dr. McCann) who performed the
independent medical examination. The personality disorder preexisted
his physical injury. Dr. Burgoyne agreed with the diagnosis of Dr.
McCann.

21.

Dr. Colledge as well as the psychiatrists found that Mr. Smith
demonstrated somatoform pain complaints. His complaints are
abundantly inconsistent which suggests to the doctors that his
complaints are founded on nonanatomical and nonphysiological
foundations.

9

(ALJ Order, p. Five, R. at 101, Petitioner's Addendum Three.)
22.

Most of the doctors found that his opiate habit is excessive given the
minimal objective findings and inconsistent pain behaviors.

24.

It would be appropriate for Mr. Smith to attend a pain clinic to reduce
his need for opiates. It would then be appropriate for him to be
worked with by the vocational rehabilitation people to assist him to be
retrained for work commensurate with his physical abilities. He will
not be able to return to heavy lifting. The employer has shown a
willingness to accommodate Mr. Smith although the positions which it
offered were not found to be appropriate at this time until Mr. Smith is
weaned from his narcotics, and is conditioned for light duty or
sedentary work.

(ALJ Order, p. Six, R. at 102, Petitioner's Addendum Three.)
Given the other medical evidence regarding Smith's non-accident
related problems, including drug addiction, psychiatric problems, poor physical
conditioning, and the fact that the most substantial medical evidence in support of
Smith's claims, Dr. Adams' diagnosis, was not in accordance with AMA guidelines,
the Commission's adoption of the medical panel report, and its consequent
determination that the industrial accident was not the medical cause of Smith's
claimed permanent total disability, were proper and in conformance with the law.
B.

Petitioner's "Marshalling of Evidence" Is a Merely a Recitation of Disputed
Medical Evidence for Which the Report of the Medical Panel Is Conclusive.
Petitioner's "marshalling of evidence" is primarily a recitation of some

of the disputed medical opinions as to whether Smith was impaired, which opinions
were submitted to and reviewed by the medical panel. These medical opinions
representing conflicting evaluations only affirm the wisdom of requiring a medical
panel to resolve apparent discrepancies regarding medical causation pointed out by
10

Petitioner. Petitioner's claim that these opinions form basis for overturning the
Commission's Order must be disregarded, since the law clearly allowed the ALJ to
rely on the expert opinion of the panel as to Smith's impairment.
Petitioner also asserts, without citing any such evidence, that "all of
Mr. Smith's treating physicians ... concluded that Mr. Smith is permanently
impaired." Even if this were true, it adds nothing to Petitioner's case. As
Petitioner so ably argues in his Brief, permanent impairment is not the same as
permanent disability, and partial impairment is not the same as total impairment
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 14-15). The fact Smith may be permanently impaired does
not mean he is permanently disabled, or even disabled at all. Hardman v. Salt Lake
Citv Fleet Mot., 725 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1986). The Commission
recognized clearly recognized this rule when Smith was awarded permanent partial
impairment pay of $6,432.18 instead of permanent total disability payments. (ALJ
Order, p. 7, R. at 103, See Petitioner's Addendum One).
Petitioner also fails to note the evidence of Smith's mental state
suggested by his "doctor shopping," ignoring treatment advice until he finally found
a surgeon who would operate. (See Statement of Additional Facts). Petitioner also
states that "only Dr. McCann made a definitive finding as to opiate dependency,"
(Petitioner's Brief, p. 8). Dr. Burgoyne concurred with Dr. McCann's diagnosis (R.
at 81), and, as Petitioner points out, Smith has been taking morphine in increasing
doses since January 1993 (Petitioner's Brief, p. 10) until as recently as February 1,

11

1996 (Fund Letter to Dr. Besendorfer, R. at 62), and the ALJ found that "most of
the doctors found that his opiate habit is excessive.(R. at 101).
II.
An Evaluation by the Division of Rehabilitation Services
Was Not Required to Deny Smith's Disability Claims.
Petitioner Smith cites Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet Mat., 725 P.2d
1323 (Utah 1986) and Hoskinas v. Industrial Comm'n., 918 P. 2d 150 (Utah App.
1996) for the proposition that the Commission "shunned its own responsibilities
and deferred to the medical panel's conclusions as to disability, which were outside
the "medical aspects" the medical panel is statutorily entitled to consider."
Petitioner's Brief, p. 29. Specifically, Smith claims the Commission's should not
have concluded Smith could be physically rehabilitated, because such conclusion is
the exclusive province of the Division of Rehabilitation Services. Petitioner's
Brief, p. 3 1 .
Smith is mistaken because, first, an evaluation of by the Division of
Rehabilitation Services is irrelevant where Smith failed to establish medical
causation, and second, the conclusion that Smith could be physically rehabilitated
as opposed to vocationaly rehabilitated was within the scope of the medical panel's
purview.
A.

Without Medical Causation, an Evaluation bv the Division of Rehabilitation
Services Was Not Relevant.
The plain reading of U.C.A. 35-1-67 requires the Commission to refer

Smith to the Division of Rehabilitative Services, only if "the employee has
12

tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled."5

The essence of

Petitioner's argument is that no claim for permanent total disability can be denied
without an evaluation by the Division of Rehabilitative Services. However, the plain
meaning of this statute is that the Commission must first make a tentative finding
of permanent total disability before submitting the matter to the Division of
Rehabilitative Services for an evaluation. To require all such claims to be evaluated
by the Division of Rehabilitative Services would be tantamount to empowering that
agency to make the initial determination of disability. The authority for that
determination has been given to the Commission in Section 35-1-67.
In this case, as demonstrated by the facts and the report of the
medical panel, the Commission decided that Smith failed to prove that he was
disabled as a result of the industrial accident, or even that there was any
physiological reason for his claimed disability. Therefore, the requirement of a
tentative finding of permanent total disability was never met.

5

The pertinent section of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 in effect at the
time of injury read, in part, as follows:
Upon tentatively determining that an employee is
permanently and totally disabled, the commission shall,
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the
employee to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under
the State Board for Vocational Education for rehabilitation
training.
Section 35-1-67 (5)(a) (1988)
13

These facts are distinguishable from facts in Hardman because there,
the Commission accepted and relied solely on a medical panel report of impairment,
and failed to make any findings of fact regarding Hardman's claimed disability.
Hardman, 725 P.2d at 1323. In this case, the Commission was required to obtain
a medical panel report to help decide the issue of medical causation. Using that
both the panel's report as to causes of Smith's impairment and its other findings of
fact to determine the cause of Smith's claimed disability, as required in Hardman,
the Commission and ALJ made a proper determination as to Smith's disability.
This case is also distinguishable from the Hoskinqs case in which,
unlike this case, the ALJ did make a "tentative finding of permanent total
disability," and was required to refer the case to the Division of Rehabilitative
Services before the tentative finding could be made final. Hoskinqs. 918 P. 2d at
153. The error identified by the Court in Hoskinqs was that, having been required
to refer the employee to the Division of Rehabilitative Services, the Commission
had to abide by that agency's vocational evaluation. kL at 1 57.

Instead, the ALJ

used the evaluation of a private rehabilitation firm to deny permanent total disability
benefits. kL at 1 56. In this case, since there was never a finding of tentative
permanent total disability, the Commission was not required to involve the Division
of Rehabilitative Services.
Neither is the case of Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n. 681 P.2d 208
(1984), on point. In that case, the Commission's rejection of the employee's claim
was based almost entirely the fact that employee had retired at 67 years of age,
14

artd that the degree of impairment was not that great. This ruling was held to be in
error by the Utah Supreme Court because the Commission's decision was
unsupported by its finding of fact, and reliance on the degree of impairment was
not supportable in view of the odd lot doctrine. In this case, the decision is
supported by the required evidence and, as discussed below, the odd lot doctrine is
not applicable.
B.

The Medical Panel Properly Considered Smith's Potential for Physical
Recovery.
The scope of the panel's conclusions are consistent with the law,

which states that the function of a medical panel is to "make findings regarding
disputed medical aspects of a compensation claim, and mav make any additional
findings, perform any tests, or make any inquiry as the Commission may require.
(Emphasis added)." Utah Admin. Code, R568-1-1F.

Neither the medical panel or

the Commission made an assessment as to Smith's vocational rehabilitation
prospects, except to say there was no physiological reason why, if Smith were to
undertake further medical treatment to overcame his drug addiction, psychiatric
problems, and attempt further physical therapy to condition his body, that he could
not perform light duty work in the future.

This assessment by the panel was

central to the question of medical causation; it was not a vocational assessment.
Therefore, such finding was necessary, and was not, as claimed by Petitioner, a
substitute for an evaluation by the Division of Rehabilitative Services, which was
not required in any event.

15

III.
Because the Commission Determined That the Work Injury Was Not
the Medical Cause of the Permanent Total Disability of Petitioner, the
Commission Was Not Required to Follow the Sequential Decision
Making Analysis or the Odd Lot Doctrine.
A.

The Commission Was Not Required to Use the Sequential Decision-Making
Process of U.C.A. § 35-1-67.
Without identifying any potential harm for the omission or showing

why the process would bring a different result, Smith claims the Commission erred
by not following the "sequential decision-making process" set forth in version of
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) in effect at the time of injury. This section
read, in part, as follows:
In cases of permanent total disability caused by an
industrial accident, the employee shall receive
compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total
disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by
the Commission of total disability, as measured by the
substance of the sequential decision-making process of
the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the
Code of Federal Regulations as revised.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988). However, for this statute to be applicable, the
first sentence of the statute itself required Smith to meet the threshold requirement
of proving his claimed permanent total disability was caused by the industrial
accident. Because the Commission found that he failed to meet this burden, it
properly concluded, "It is therefore unnecessary to consider the subsidiary elements

16

of the "sequential decision making process" of § 35-1-67 of the Act."
(Commission's Order, p. 4, R. at 126).
B.

The Commission Was Not Required to Consider the Odd Lot Doctrine.
Petitioner's argument that allowing to Commission's decision to stand

would always preclude use of the "odd lot doctrine"6 is without merit.

First,

Petitioner raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Failure to raise an issue
below precludes its consideration on appeal. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11 Ave.
Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993).
Second, the very nature of the odd lot doctrine first requires a finding
of causation.

Specifically, "unless the claimant has suffered a compensable

industrial injury, the [odd lot] doctrine is inapplicable no matter how compelling the
other factors." Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 785 P.2d 1127, 1132
(Utah App. 1987).

"For the odd lot doctrine to apply, the Commission must first

determine there is medical causation between [Smith's] industrial accident and his
now claimed permanent total disability. Zupon v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960,
963 (Utah App. 1993).

Because the Commission found the industrial accident

was not the cause of the claimed permanent total disability, the odd lot doctrine
need not have been considered.

6

Under the odd lot doctrine, the fact finder may find permanent total
disability when a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial
accident is combined with other factors to render the claimant unable to find
suitable unemployment. Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet Mamt., 725 P.2d 1323,
1326 (Utah 1986).
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Third, Petitioner fails to point out how the odd lot doctrine would
apply in this case where petitioner was only forty-five (45) years old, where the
range of his rate of pay was from four to six dollars an hour (R. at 2 0 3 - 2 0 5 ) , which
encompasses the minimum wage standard for any future job, and where the ALJ
was presented w i t h evidence Mity Lite would tailor a job to fit his conditions. (ALJ
Order, p. Six, R. at 1 0 2 , Petitioner's Addendum Three.)
CONCLUSION
The Commission's finding of fact that the industrial injury was not the
medical cause of Petitioner's claimed permanent total disability was supported by
substantial evidence including justified reliance on the report of a medical panel as
to Smith's impairment, as well as substantial evidence in support of that
determination. The finding of fact of no medical causation precluded the necessity
for the Commission to refer Smith to the Division of Rehabilitation Services, to
consider the sequential decision-making process or the odd lot doctrine. The
Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review should be therefore be upheld by
the Court.
DATED th\s//^

day o f ^ g ^ y / v ^

1996.

Serald J . Uajjatin,
Sandra N. Dredge
DREDGE & LALLATIN, L.C.
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ///>> day of / ^ f r / T ^ * ^
1996 to the following:
David Mortensen
Sherlynn Fenstermaker
IVIE & YOUNG
48 N. University Avenue
Provo, UT 84601
Attorneys or Applicant
Alan L. Hennebold
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Erie Boorman
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. Box 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 8114-6611

torney fcY Respondents Mity Lite
and Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah
gal/smith.brf
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ADDENDUM
(Report of Medical Panel)

(801)321-1763

MADISON H. THOMAS, M.C.
8TH AVENUE & C STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84143

Benjamin A. Sims
Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 E. 300 So./P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Date of Panel: 23 November 1994
Re:
Robert W. Smith
Inj:
May 23, 1990
Emp: Mity Lite

REPORT OF MEDICAL PANEL
A medical panel consisting of Drs. A. Owen Smoot and Madison H. Thomas, with the latter as
chairman, met to evaluate the case of Robert W. Smith, with reference to an injury reported to
have occurred on 23 May 1990.
The file made available to the panel was reviewed by the panel members. The history was
reviewed in detail, using the summary provided the panel as a general outline. The applicant was
examined by the panel members, and X-rays were reviewed. Additional current X-rays were
secured, and findings of these have been included in the panel's considerations.
The applicant reviewed his current problems with the panel, while standing with his walker and
moving around. He indicates his lower back hurts him all the time. He describes this as a
shooting, burning pain inside his back, which spreads down his legs to his ankle, especially on the
right. He indicates a few days ago, he had a bad fall when he stepped with his right leg and it did
not seem to be there to support him. He reports he had some stitches and a knot on his head. He
was taken to American Fork, and believes he couldn't breathe, and might have passed out for a
few minutes. He understands he was to have X-rays of his knee and his back, and thinks he is
supposed to have another MRJ.
He describes this shooting, burning pain in his back going down to his ankleVas beginning about
three years ago after surgery. He has a sense that there is no feeling in his legs, and therefore, he
uses the walker.
He reports using 30 mg of morphine sulfate every three to four hours, and occasionally if he is
worse, he takes more. He has tried a TENS unit, without help, both before and after surgery. He
feels the pain is increased when he puts weight on his right leg and estimated at a six on a scale
of zero to ten. Without weight on the right leg, it is only three.
The applicant indicates he spends his time mostly lying around. He walks around the house, but
does not help with housework, managing the car, lawn mowing, or shopping. He will shower and
and then lie down for a time. The hot water helps, but does not stop the pain. He indicates all
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of these things are a problem to him, and concludes with the query as to why his back can't be
fixed so he can go back to work.
The applicant indicates he continues to have pain in the right shoulder, which began a couple of
years ago. He reports frequent headaches, which begin at the back of his neck and spread forward
to his eyes. These are bilateral and seem to throb with his heartbeat. These may last 10 to 12
hours per day. He has blurred vision, but not associated with the headache. He feels he can't see
things up close. He does not read and does not watch television because of this. He reports his
neck is all right now. After his second surgery, he began having pain spreading all through his
tailbone, which persists, in spite of having shots directly into the tailbone. He still feels better if
he sits on a ring cushion because of this symptom. He indicates that in therapy, his hips still lock
and hurt and will pop at times.
The applicant indicates his general health had been good prior to the reported date of injury in
1990. He denied back pain. He had done labor jobs for an extended period of time, and does not
believe in chiropractors and has never gone to one.
The applicant indicates that he was at work on 23 May 1990. He had had a helper in lifting some
pallets which were made of oak and estimated as weighing 125 to 150 pounds. He recalls severe
pain was experienced on one occasion when he lifted one of these pallets alone. This was located
in the lower back. A few hours later, he went to the Orem emergency room and reported back
pain and he was noted to have muscle tenderness in the paraspinal muscles on the right. X-rays
at the time showed some facet degeneration and disc space narrowing at L4-5, with a lesser degree
at L5-S1.
On 31 May, Dr. Berry saw him and noted pain limited to the lower spine. He noted spasm and
tenderness and recommended physical therapy and some anti-inflammatory medications, with about
three weeks off work. He continued to follow him and reported leg pain appeared. In July, an
MRI scan showed bulging discs at L4-5. Dr. Berry felt inclined not to do surgery.
In August 1990, Dr. Colledge saw him, and the applicant expressed some concern about this,
indicating that he felt Dr. Colledge walked out on him and did not completely examine him,
although Dr. Colledge does indicate marked restriction of lumbar flexion, but with negative straight
leg raising. He found sensory decrease over an L-5 distribution on the right. He recommended
further therapy and anti-inflammatory medications, with some facet joint injections being
considered.
Dr. Smith saw him in September 1990, with back symptoms, as well as knee pain. In October,
he noted the applicant had fallen when his right leg gave way, and pain seemed to be increased.
He was treated by Dr. Root, who gave him Dolobid and later Voltaren and Cytotec, along with a
back support and limited lifting, along with physical therapy, and subsequently had Diazepam and
Vicodin and epidural blocks, which reportedly caused increased pain.
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The applicant reviewed the fact that he had had his first operation in 1991 frh a herniated disc, and
he feels this was the best operation. The second one was in May 1992, and a third one was in
August 1992. He understands that something was put in place to keep Jit pain from coming back.
He has also had repeated injections. His morphine sulfate was started at 15 mg, after other things
had been tried. He feels he has never been free of pain since the first surgery. He believes he has
been about the same as he is now for about a year and a half, though he qualifies this with a
feeling that maybe he is getting worse, but nothing very specific. He has also used Toradol,
ephedrine, Fiorinal, Demerol, and some patches for pain relief.
It is not at all clear as to his relationship to a pain clinic. He indicates that he was referred to one,
but he never went there. He, however, indicates that five or six months ago, he started seeing Dr.
Washburn, and Dr. Washburn has given him Valium. He only took one of these, because he said
he didn't want to be there and didn't want to use that medication. He has also used something like
Doplyn, and apparently he felt this was related to sleep, but when he used this, he couldn't stay
awake. He began using Elavil (antidepressant) in a dosage of 50 mg five or six months ago.
Sometimes he takes five tablets at night in order to help himself sleep.
He has been followed by Dr. Adams, but reports Dr. Adams died about a month ago, and he has
been sent to Dr. Gaufin, who in turn has said he should go back to his regular primary care
physician, Dr. Besendorfor for his care.
Other evaluations have included internal medicine evaluation by Dr. Murray who found no other
contraindications to surgery. In January 1993, EMG study of the lower extremities was normal,
as done by Dr. Watkins.
Differences of opinion about his impairment have ranged from Dr. Nord's 11% to Dr. Adams'
100%, with the pain and narcotics interfering with his ability to undertake employment.
In February 1994, Dr. McCann felt he had conversion disorder, somatoform pain disorder, opium
dependency, and personality disorder.
The applicant is 43 years of age. His height is 6 feet 2 inches, and current weight is 240 pounds.
He right handed. He reports he has had kidney stones occurring on two occasions, which were
painful, but not as severe as his back pain. He has had hernias repaired with no current symptoms.
He is constipated, which he attributes to his medications. He has poor appetite and tends to eat
frequent meals during the day. He has no allergies, except he gets diarrhea and vomiting from
Demerol. He has had a fracture of the right humerus at the age of 10 when he fell from a tree
with no subsequent problems. He had a cholecystectomy and gets along well, except he seems
upset by greasy foods, lettuce, etc. He has some scars from being cut up as a youth when four
minority group members attacked him.
He denies the use of alcohol or tobacco. He has had no drug problem, except for prescription
drugs. He was born in Florida. He is married and has three children. He reports he has had no
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benefits in that last two years, but has Social Security Disability. Family history includes a
question of cancer, hernia, or drinking problem in his father, who died when he was three. His
mother died when he was 15 from cancer. He has a brother who has a drinking problem, and
apparently most of his relatives do likewise.
EXAMINATION:
Examination reveals a man who appears in a good general state of health. He is large and well
muscled, with mild abdominal obesity. He stood up for the history taking and while waiting for
the examiners, slightly bent forward over his walker, which was not quite tall enough for him. He
had a 7 inch lumbar scar which was well healed. There was a 2 x 5 cm brownish spot to the left
of the scar and nearby a 1 cm tag of tissue. He had no atrophy around the shoulder girdles. He
had forward flexion 135° on the right and 150° on the left. Abduction was 90° on the right and
120° on the left. Internal rotation allowed reaching to the sacrum on the right and to D12 on the
left. Other movements were within normal range. He had tenderness over the anterior shoulder,
especially over the bicipital groove.
The cervical spine showed no limitation.
The dorsal spine showed no scoliosis or tenderness.
The lumbosacral spine showed midline tenderness over the scar, which increased towards the sacral
area. There was tenderness in a similar paraspinal lumbar area. He reported pain over the
sacrospinalis insertion. Spinal movements were almost non-existent, with great discomfort
expressed on any effort to get more adequate range of motion. He showed 10° of flexion, 20° of
extension, lateral bending 15°, and essentially no rotation, with pain expression limiting the
movements. He had tripoding at 45° on the right and 70° on the left on sitting straight leg raising.
Range of motion was not considered valid.
The hip movements were satisfactory, with a complaint of pain in the back on movements on
internal and external rotation. His left leg appeared to be approximately 1/2 inch shorter than the
right, but he showed no limitation of function. The feet had probable normal strength, though he
complained of discomfort on testing, referring to the back. The calf measured 16 3/4 on the right
and 17 on the left. Above knee measured 18 3/4 on the right and 19 on the left. He could walk
on heels and toes, using his walker for balance. He did not stand on his right foot without holding
onto his walker.
Knee jerks were 1+ and symmetrical.
Babinski was negative.

Ankle jerks were 1+ on the right and 2+ on the left.

Sensory examination showed the tuning fork perceived symmetrically, within normal limits. The
sharp object was reported not as sharp on the right as the left over the lateral calf and lateral foot,
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with the left foot and thigh being reported as sharper. He reported dullness over the anterolateral
aspect of both thighs, consistent with a lateral femoral cutaneous nerve distribution.
X-rays were reviewed and appear consistent with the reports involved in the file, with the earliest
X-rays showing degenerative changes. Current X-rays are as shown in the attached report.
The AMA Guide to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment Third Edition was used as a reference.
Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was involved in circumstances as outlined, the panel
concludes in terms of reasonable medical probability as follows:
1)

The applicant's current back problems stem from his low back industrial injury of 23 May
1990 to the extent of approximately 2/3 of the current impairment, as compared to 1/3 for
his pre-existing condition.
Comment: Although allegedly asymptomatic prior to the injury, there were definite
radiologic degenerative changes present before the injury, and although his multiple
surgical procedures have not been successful in relieving his pain, it would not be
reasonable to attribute a significant portion of the present condition to the surgical
interventions, as they were based on the condition of the pre-existing and industrial injury
effects.

2)

The estimate of impairment attributable to the injury, pre-existing conditions, or other
causes is as shown on the following tabulation:
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% WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT
%

Low back: Herniated disc,
surgically treated with persisting
pain, with multiple operations
1 (10% + 2% + 1% = 13% WP)
Shoulders: limitation of range of
motion
(R = 3% + 4% = 7% UE = 4% WP
L = 2% + 3% = 5% UE = 3% WP

Whole Person
Impairment

23
May
1990

Pre-existing
or
Subsequent

13%

2/3

1/3

7%

None

Ail

5%

None

1 4% + 3% = 7% WP)
Psychiatric status: somatoform pain
disorder, opiate dependency,
personality disorder, depression

3)

1

AU

The applicant has been temporarily and totally disabled subsequent to 22 May 1990 due
to the industrial injury for a period of approximately six months after his last surgical
intervention.
Comment: It is the panel's impression that this is a very adequate period for surgical
stabilization, and the applicant, himself, indicates he has not had significant change in
approximately that interval of time. Much of his inability to return to work stems from
factors other than the results of the injury.

4)

a.

The medical care received by the applicant for his back after 22 May 1990 was
related to the injury of 23 May 1990.

b.

Future medical care related to the injury of May 23, 1990 will include infrequent
periodic orthopedic follow-up for counsel with reference to appropriate activities,
weight control, exercise approaches, and use of appropriate anti-inflammatory
drugs, and "safe" pain relieving medications. It seems quite unlikely that further
surgery will produce any additional benefit, unless there are some major unforeseen
future events, which would have to be incorporated into the allocation. A pain
clinic for a fixed period of time may have merit, if only to get him away from his
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narcotic use, which has prevailed for some time. Because of personality factors,
this should be strictly for a limited period of time a~ter which any persisting
symptoms would not be further considered as part of the specific injury effects.
Such an effort should be geared to an appropriate planning for training to provide
him with an occupational goal within his capabilities. It should be noted he has a
severe educational background deficit which will limit the scope of his efforts.
6)

The physical limitations which limit his work are currently quite severe, at least partly
based on psychological effects. He should, however, be able to manage light duty
activities, once he becomes better conditioned for this. His shoulder limitation should not
be a restrictive factor beyond limitations because of his back condition. It is possible the
wearing of glasses would increase his capabilities.

7)

The Job Positions shown in paragraph seven and eight of the Preliminary Findings of Fact
have been reviewed. In his current status, and probably at the time they were offered to
him, he does not seem likely to manage those jobs adequately with any degree of success.
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Members of the panel will be happy to try and respond to any additional questions if it would be
helpful.
Respectfully submitted,

Mffiiison H. Thomas, M.D.
Panfel Chairman

^A&
A. Owen Smoot, M.D.
Panel Member
MHTxsw
Attachments:

X-ray report
Dr. Burgoyne's report

